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Social media are important channels for crisis 
and risk communication by government agencies. 
However, existing frameworks for studying these 
messages use loose and inconsistent terminology, 
making it difficult to build on this research and 
understand how message features impact message 
diffusion. In this study, we provide a framework based 
on textual and media dimensions of messages for 
improved analysis of social media crisis and risk 
communication. We apply the framework to a sample 
of Twitter posts from United States local, state and 
federal public health agencies during a year of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Results show reasonable 
reliability levels for coding of message features; 
differences and similarities of messages across local, 
state and federal public health agencies; and 
significant associations between message features and 
message diffusion. The study contributes to research 
on crisis and risk messages, and our understanding of 
the impacts of message features on message diffusion. 
1. Introduction  
In periods of crisis, reliable information and 
communication by government agencies can mitigate 
harmful impacts and are an essential part of crisis 
management [1, 2]. On social media  in particular, 
public health messages can be retransmitted across 
networks by the public itself, widening message reach 
[3, 4, 5]. While social media  are notable notification 
systems for extreme events [3], they have also been 
institutionalized as part of government [6], and are 
employed by various types of local, state and federal 
agencies in  crisis and risk communication [3, 4, 7]. 
Despite the importance of a social media presence, 
there is no unifying framework for analysis of 
government social media messages during crises. 
Existing frameworks seem to use ad-hoc [8, 9], or a  
purely based on a lexical approach [10, 11]. Studies 
often do not distinguish intention of messages (e.g. 
“inform”, “increase resilience” [10, 12, 13]) from 
policies (e.g. “closures/openings” [10]), or everything 
is called a “topic” [8]. Sometimes the categories for 
message analysis are themselves metaphorical (e.g. 
“fighting rumours” [13]) or are vague and difficult to 
validate (e.g. “open and transparent messages”[14]).  
Previous studies have distinct purposes and have 
contributed to our understanding of crisis and risk  
communication messages on social media. However, 
the “categories”, [9, 15], “strategies” [16], “frames” 
[9] or “features” [11] of crisis and risk messages could 
benefit from a more linguistically informed 
framework; one that distinguishes speech acts (e.g. 
message purpose or intention) from topics (e.g. risk  
information), while also including other relevant 
dimensions of social media messages such as speaker, 
audience and types of images—which are important 
but not previously systematically explored [1, 17].  
Such a  framework could help integrate the various 
message features from the literature and help 
formalize analysis in this domain. Also, integration 
can help us better understand the impact of message 
features on message diffusion. Existing studies have 
several findings about the impact of message features 
on rates of message diffusion (i.e. public sharing) in 
crisis situations [8, 9, 10, 16], but given inconsistent 
terminology it is difficult to build upon them. 
To contribute to the literature, we thus provide a 
framework of government social media messages for 
crisis and risk communication based on textual and 
media analysis [17, 18, 19]. The framework integrates 
categories from the literature, adds additional ones, 
and focus on the syntax and semantics of the texts. We 
also asked the following research questions (RQs): 
RQ1. How reliable are the framework features for 
analyzing crisis-related social media messages? 
RQ2. How are message features employed across 
levels of government agencies throughout a crisis? 
RQ3. How are specific message features associated 
with message diffusion rates? 
We addressed these questions via a case analysis of 
a sample of Covid-19 related “tweets” (also referred to 
as posts or messages) from 85 local, state and federal 





United States (US) public health agencies main 
Twitter accounts, covering the year of 2020, across 
multiple waves of the pandemic.  
We found the features of the proposed framework to 
have mostly moderate and strong inter-rater reliability 
measures. We also observed interesting patterns in the 
use of Twitter and message features across agency 
levels, some of it following waves of the pandemic. 
We also observed significant relationships between 
certain message features and their rates of diffusion.  
In the following sections, we present a  literature 
review, methods, and findings, followed by our 
discussion in light of existing theories about message 
design and the goals of public health and government 
agencies. We conclude with study limitations and 
directions for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Crisis and risk communication on social 
media by government agencies 
Social media (SM) have been widely adopted by 
government agencies to communicate with the public 
in crises [3, 4, 8]. Communication is important in these 
situations to help the public make informed decisions, 
and reduce overall public harm [1, 20, 21]. In the US 
most adults use social media  [22], and they are widely 
adopted by emergency management [3] and public 
health agencies [8]. Given wide adoption of SM in 
society and government, it is useful to understand the 
expectations of the public and agencies in these 
environments. Better understanding of the textual and 
media elements could also lead to better government 
communication strategies, and potential differences 
across local, state and federal agencies [7]. Since SM 
allow for public sharing of messages [4, 5, 10], which 
increases message reach, understanding how features 
play a role in message diffusion can help instruct 
guidelines for better message design.  
2.2 Features of government crisis and risk 
communication messages 
Crisis and risk communication (CRC) messages on 
SM have been largely studied and have various 
relevant features. For example, a  popular “genre 
analysis” proposed 5 “top-level genres” (broadcast 
information, broadcast warning, encourage behavior, 
appeal for information, fighting rumours) to 
categorize flood [13] and earthquake emergency 
communications [12]. Others have examined 
“condolences” and “encouragement” [4] messages, 
while recent studies examined “resilience” and 
“susceptibility” content, among others [10, 11].  
While these approaches provide useful and unique 
analyses, “message content” is often defined in a 
nebulous way. For example, studies often employ 
“information” as a category, when any part of any a 
message can be considered information [3, 4, 12]. The 
notion of a “warning” is also difficult to observe from 
text unless explicitly stated, as any message about a 
crisis or risk can be a warning.   
In this section,  we provide a framework for analysis 
of crisis and risk social media messages based on 
linguistic theories of textual analysis [18, 19] and 
image use in risk messages [17]. We incorporate 
categories/features from the literature, and add some 
not previously explored, including speakers, audience 
and image types,  We also discuss previous results on 
associations between message feature and diffusion 
(i.e. sharing; retransmission).  
The literature for this study was identified via 
keyword search (i.e., “social media”, “message”, 
“crisis/risk communication”, “public health” and 
“crisis management”) from, Web of Science, Scopus 
and Google Scholar. From an iterative review of the 
various themes from the literature, we identified seven 
broad textual dimensions and one media dimension to 
construct the framework. These are: speech function, 
topic, threat focus, type of resource, audience, 
speaker, rhetorical tactic and media. Each of these 
dimensions includes more granular message features. 
The framework is not exhaustive, and can be 
expanded. It is devised with tweets and short Facebook 
posts in mind. A summary of the framework is 
provided in Table 1 and discussed below.   
 
Speech function. Speech functions, also called speech 
acts, are the distinct types of social functions that can 
be observed from text [18]. For example, a  statement 
such as: “an emergency has been declared” (a 
representative) has the function of informing or 
representing something; the statement “you must 
evacuate the area” (a directive) has the function to 
command or direct an action. The first reflects an 
existing phenomenon; the latter attempts to bring a 
phenomenon into being by directing others to do it. 
Speech act theory is a field of research with nuanced 
and competing models, but this framework identifies 
basic speech functions that are well recognized [18, 
23]. These have been previously referred to as 
“sentence style” of messages in CRC [3], but speech 
functions are more than simply “style”. The first 
speech function is the representative, also known as 
assertive, and associated with the declarative form 
[18]. This speech function is relevant as it is associated 
with information provision. It describes, explains or 
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justifies phenomena [19]. In a study examining the 
role of these types of statements on message diffusion, 
it was found that the presence of a declarative sentence 
had a positive but not significant association with  
diffusion on Twitter in a hurricane scenario [3].  
Directives, also referred to as commands are 
statements that indicate what a person must or should 
do, usually in imperative tense (e.g. “Wear a mark”) 
Searle also considered some requests as directives, 
since they attempt to draw a listener response [24]. In 
this framework, statements such as “you must” or “you 
should”, or statements in the imperative form such as 
“answer the call” are considered directives. Messages 
with imperatives were associated with higher levels of 
diffusion in multiple emergency scenarios [3].  
Expressives are statements that express an attitude 
or sentiment of the speaker. They may appear as 
representatives, such as “we’re sad to say” or as phatic 
expressions such as “thanks”. In the framework, we 
considered symbolic language such as “Be a hero!” as 
expressives [25]. It is important to show empathy in 
crisis communication [1], and others have discussed 
the use of “emotion-evaluative” [3], “resilience” [11] 
and “reassurance” message features in related contexts 
[9]. The presence of “emotion-evaluative” content has 
been found associated with higher message diffusion 
in multiple CRC scenarios [3], while “resilience” 
keywords had a more mixed but positive relationship 
in the context of Covid-19 [11].  
A reply to a specific citizen question or comment is 
considered here as a  distinct speech function since it is 
the provision of directly and specifically requested 
information. A reply may not be genuine or valuable, 
but it is a  reflection of participatory government [6], 
potentially leading to trust and credibility. 
A request is a  distinct speech act because it creates 
an open chance for engagement with the speaker. In 
some cases a directive may seem like a request [24], 
e.g.: “Get vaccina ted soon”. However, requests here 
are statements that seek some kind of citizen input, 
including an answer to a question; or material 
assistance from the public, such as volunteering, 
policy participation or donations. 
Previous studies have examined the role of 
“question marks” and “interrogative sentences” in 
diffusion rates, but results are not consistent [3, 11]. 
Nevertheless, based on initial observations, we noted 
a type of rhetorical question that was prevalent in the 
messages, employed to identify a topic or relevant 
audience (e.g., “Did you know that…”). We referred 
to these statements as question prompts and included 
them as a speech function since no other speech 
function seemed appropriate for these clauses.   
 
Topic/Domain. The topic of the message refers to the 
contexts or domains of phenomena reflected in the text 
[19]. There are many specific topics or domains that 
could be relevant during CRC. Here we propose five 
general topics/domains that are largely mutually 
exclusive and align with categories in the literature.  
Descriptions of the cause, risk, mechanism and/or 
impacts may seem like many topics but it reflects 
scientific and causal information about the threat. This 
is close to what others have called “symptoms”, 
“disease mechanisms” [9], “risk and crisis 
information” [26], and “susceptibility” [11]. In other 
studies, “susceptibility” keywords had mixed 
correlation with message diffusion, but “symptoms” 
and  “technical information” keywords were positively 
associated with message diffusion [10, 11].  
A second feature in the model refers to information 
about the prevalence and statistics of the spread of the 
threat, which may include sophisticated surveillance 
information about cases, test results, etc. This is a 
Table 1. A framework of social media message features for analysis of crisis and risk communication 
SPEECH FUNCTION TOPIC/DOMAIN 
TYPE OF  
RESOURCE 
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relevant category as it provides reliable and 
generalized information about the threat prevalence 
that may be difficult for the public to obtain otherwise. 
As recently examined, this feature was particularly 
effective in message diffusion [11]. 
How to protect or treat was conceived as a distinct 
message feature that refers to what has been discussed 
as efficacy [27]. This type of information mentions 
how the public can protect from or treat the threat, and 
are important because they offer practical content. 
These statements may be similar to those on causes or 
symptoms, but more clearly focus on action to protect 
from risk. Messages with efficacy features were 
associated with message diffusion in public health 
[27], and emergency management agencies [11].  
Another message feature is: actions, policies or 
programs, which is similar to what others have called 
“official action” [27], “official responses” [11] and 
“operations” [8] most of which had weak but positive 
associations with message diffusion. Either way, 
government agencies are likely to want to show their 
engagement and positive actions during crises [21]. 
Moreover, citizens may want to know what the current 
actions, policies and programs available are.  
We conceived of a separate emergent events/policy 
changes to refer to messages that are more timely 
during an ongoing crisis. During a long-term 
pandemic, some messages may be more timely than 
others. In related studies this has been narrowly 
discussed as “closures/openings” [8]—found to have 
mixed results with message diffusion [3, 11]).  
 
Threat focus. Threat focus is the threat or risk at issue 
referenced in the message, of which there will be a 
primary threat (e.g. Covid-19). However, messages 
may also be about a secondary threat that arises from 
or are related to the primary threat [11]. In the context 
of the Covid-19 pandemic these have included mental 
health and child abuse [28, 29]. In a recent study, 
tweets identifying “secondary impacts” were 
positively associated with diffusion [11].  
 
Type of resource. A message itself is an 
informational resource. Messages may also include 
other informational resources: hyperlinks/URLs to 
more information; and references to interactive 
resources, such as hotlines, live videos or press 
conferences. Messages may also correct existing 
mis/information or rumors that can easily spread on 
social media  [30].  
Previous research examining the role of URLs and 
“corrections” in CRC messages found that URLs are 
associated with lower message diffusion, whereas 
corrections had mixed results [3, 11, 16]. These same 
studies defined interactive resources as “information” 
and “information sharing” (regrettably), which had a 
negative association with diffusion.  
We also observed that messages may refer to 
material resources that are available, such as tests, 
vaccines, financial assistance or others, which may be 
more valuable than informational resources alone. We 
thus included this as a separate feature of framework. 
 
Audience and speaker. In CRC it is important to 
identify the audience of a  message [1, 2]. Since the 
public is diverse, and distinct information, threats or 
resources may target specific groups, it is important to 
understand the publics toward which messages are 
directed. We assume that if a  message is posted on 
Twitter, it is for the general public. However, 
messages may indicate a population group (e.g., 
elders, youth, individuals with diabetes) or mention a  
person toward which the message is directed. 
Population group as defined here includes some of 
what has been referred to as “susceptibility” (which 
we conceive as risk information), and it was found to 
be positively but weakly associated with message 
diffusion in a  recent Covid-19 study [11].  
Another major message dimension refers to the 
speaker. If a  message is posted by an agency, the 
agency is the main speaker. But a  message may quote 
other speakers, or identify another subject of the 
action. Research in risk message design have noted the 
importance of “celebrity-based appeals” [31], and 
agency messages can often figure politicians [32]. We 
also identify agency expert/staff, and external agent as 
potential speakers. It appears research has not tested 
how distinct speakers may improve message diffusion.  
 
Rhetorical tactic. Rhetoric is the art of discourse, and 
there are several relevant tactics that can be employed 
in crisis and risk situations [33]. Here we describe 
four. The first is collective frame, which is the use of 
collective pronouns and references to friends, family 
and community, as a rationale for action. Public 
emergencies are inherently collective problems, and 
any a message may emphasize its collective nature. 
Collective frames have been discussed as “collective 
efficacy”, and found to be positively, although weakly, 
associated with message diffusion [11]. 
Other rhetorical tactics are metaphors, strong 
emphasis, and positive frame. Since simplifying 
language is important for understanding risks [1], 
metaphors may be important in the context of 
clarifying scientific information. Positive frame is 
relevant given the role of strategic self-presentation by 
government agencies in social media [34]. Strong 
emphasis refers to the use of exclamation or 
capitalized letters in text.  This last variable has had 
mixed effects on message diffusion [3, 11].   
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Media. A social media post is its own unique medium, 
and social media messages may include additional 
media. On Twitter and Facebook, in addition to text, 
this usually includes: an image, a  video, a hyperlink 
and/or a hashtag [35]. We also include a  separate 
feature for identifying additional text in image. 
Recently, textual content on images of Covid-19 
related messages were positively associated with  
diffusion, more so than the same text feature outside 
of the image [11]. The study of [11] found that the 
inclusion of an image, URL or hashtag were 
negatively associated with message diffusion, but 
others have generally found the opposite concerning 
the impact of images on message diffusion [10, 27]. 
Pictures and images are important pieces of content 
in risk communication [17], but have not been 
examined in detail in previous studies of crisis and risk 
communication. Even in a recent study of Instagram 
content [26], an entirely image-based social media 
platform, the types of images themselves were not 
explored. Pictures and images can help in persuasion, 
comprehension and recall of messages [17]. In this 
study, we propose at least three types of images to 
consider: photographs (e.g., of people, situations); 
illustrations (e.g., of things or processes); and 
infographics (e.g., charts, maps, demonstrations).  
3. Methods 
 To address our research questions, this study 
conducted manual coding of sampled tweets based on 
the framework. The annotation results were validated 
by calculating inter-rater reliability. We also provided 
descriptive statistics of social media use across agency 
levels and multiple waves of the pandemic. We then 
performed inferential statistics to assess impact of 
message features on message diffusion. Details on 
methods can be found at: lhei.org/covid19study.html   
The Covid-19 pandemic was selected for this study 
given its immediate and grave nature as one of the 
deadliest pandemics in recent history [36], and also to 
facilitate the analysis in a single crisis domain: public 
health emergencies. We decided to analyze local, state 
and federal agencies to provide a strong test for the 
framework in the context of government agencies, and 
help understand how messages may across agency 
levels. Twitter was selected given its practical API for 
data retrieval, and as it is one of the popular platforms 
used widely by public health agencies [10, 27].  
3.1 Data collection and annotation 
First, we identified relevant public health agencies 
for the study. For federal agencies: we identified 
Twitter accounts for 11 major federal health agencies 
in the US associated with infection prevention and 
control; for state agencies: we collected all the Twitter 
accounts of all 50 state public health agencies. For 
local agencies: we identified the 50 largest cities in the 
50 states, plus DC, and searched for their main local 
or county public health agency, of which we found a 
total of 33 Twitter accounts. (See full list of agencies 
at: lhei.org/covid19study.html).  
For the 92 official Twitter accounts identified, we 
retrieved all tweets (original tweets and replies) from 
01/01/2020 to 12/31/2020. From this dataset, we then 
retrieved all tweets with a  textual reference to: ncov, 
covid, corona, pandemic, or sars-cov. The earliest 
covid-19 tweet was on Jan. 11, by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) main account.   
In preparation for the annotation task, we retrieved 
a random sample of 905 covid-related tweets and 
replies in a manner proportional to the amount of 
tweets per agency level in the dataset. The rationale 
was to sample from the variety of accounts and 
messages in the population (N=51,192 tweets and 
replies). Given the detailed manual annotation, the 905 
sample is similar to other studies [9, 16]. 
The annotation of messages consisted in a binary 
coding for the presence of the feature in the text or 
text-in-image. Three authors trained together and then 
independently annotated the sample dataset, where 
ultimately n=902. A 20% sub-sample of tweets were 
independently double coded to calculate Cohen’s 
kappa statistic of inter-rater reliability (IRR) for each 
feature [37]. Observed discordance in these results 
was discussed and final values agreed upon. 
3.2 Analytical Procedures  
RQ1. How reliable are the framework features for 
analyzing crisis-related social media messages? To 
address this question, we used Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient, which provides values between 0 and 1. 
Levels below .41 are interpreted as weak; levels 
between .41-.60 are weak to moderate; above .61 
moderate to substantial; and between .81-1 as strong 
to almost perfect [37, 38].  
RQ2. How are message features employed across 
government agencies throughout the crisis? 
We addressed this question by calculating the 
proportional distribution of message features across 
agency levels. To provide a long term view, we also 
visualized Twitter activity over time, across multiple 
waves of the pandemic. We calculated the 7-day 
moving averages of: average posts by agency level; 
total retweets of agency posts by level; and total 
confirmed covid-19 cases in the US through 2020. 
RQ3. How are message features associated with the 
message diffusion rate (DR)?  
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To address this question, we calculated a  diffusion 
rate of message m (𝐷𝑅𝑚 ) as the normalized retweet 





where 𝑅𝑇𝑚  is the retweet count of the message, and 𝐹𝑎  
is the follower count of the account that posted the 
message. Although messages are not only retweeted 
(i.e., shared, retransmitted) by an account’s followers, 
this measure controls for the account’s network size.   
For every feature, we computed the mean DR of all 
messages that contained the feature, and of all 
messages that did not contain it, and compared these 
two groups via independent samples Welch’s t-test 
(two-tailed). Although assumptions of normality and 
equal variance were not met, and the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney (WMW) test may be best, a  number of 
features have relatively high sample size, indicating 
Welch’s t-test may be preferable [39]. Moreover, the 
WMW test when applied to our data  provided more 
significant, and untenable, results. We thus report 
analyses from the Welch’s t-test.   
4. Results  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics. As can be 
observed, local, state and federal agencies made on 
average a comparable number of tweets and replies, 
although state agencies were on average more active. 
Federal agency accounts were more popular than state 
and local agencies by multiple orders of magnitude  
 4.1 Inter-rater reliability for annotation task 
Kappa values above .81 were: question; prevalence; 
how-to-protect; material resource; political figure; 
and text-in-image. Kappa values between .61 and .8 
were: directive; scientific-information; policy/action; 
interactive resource; corrective; population group; 
secondary threat; agency expert/staff; collective frame 
positive frame; and strong emphasis. Low kappa were: 
request (.56) and external speaker (.58). Emergent 
event; metaphor; and personality did not sufficiently 
appear in this task for reliable ratings to be assessed.  
4.2 Twitter activity and message features 
across local, state, and federal agencies  
Figure 1 shows the rapid increase in Covid-19 
related messages weeks prior to the declaration of a 
global pandemic by the World Health Organization on 
March 11. As shown, state agencies are the most active 
throughout the pandemic. Posting activity subsides in 
about 3 months, but rises again, mostly for state and  
federal agencies, with the third wave. Figure 1 shows 
that the initial public response (as retweets of agency 
posts) is high across agency levels, but subsides within  
one month, without large subsequent increases.  
Table 3 shows the proportion of local, state, and 
federal posts that contained each message feature. 
Local agencies employed the most: question prompt, 
expressive, how-to-protect, corrective, other 
language, direct mention, external speaker, strong 
emphasis, positive frame and text-in-image.  
State agencies employed the most representative 
statements, participatory requests, replies, interactive 
resources, political figure and collective frame. 
Federal agencies employed the most: directive,  
scientific information, emergent events, action/policy, 
references to secondary threat and population group, 
agency expert/staff, personality, and all of the media 
features except text-in-image. The highest differences 




Table 2. Sample (s) and population (p) statistics for  
tweets related to Covid-19 throughout 2020 
  Local State Federal All 
Twitter  
accounts 
s 30 45 10 85 
p 33 48 11 92 
Total tweets  
and replies 
s 277 535 90 902 
p 15,699 30,408 5,022 51,129 
Total replies 
s 15 53 8 76 
p 1,044 3,427 641 5,112 
Mean followers 





















count per tweet 
(std. dev.) 
s 8.3 (28.6) 16.8 (29.9) 329.3 (1304) 45.2 (420) 
p 10.3 (52.9) 17.6 (54.6) 153.6 (537.7) 28.2 (178.4) 
Figure 1. Average posts per agency, total public  
retweets and confirmed US Covid-19 cases, 2020 
Note: Covid-19 data from Johns Hopkins University at: 
https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19  
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Table 3. Proportion of local, state and federal  
posts that contained each feature 
                              Proportion of posts with each feature Total 
(n=902)   Loc (n=277) State (n=535) Fed (n=90) 
 feature % n 










 Directive 47.2 39.8 53.3 392 
Question 15.1 8.5 12.2 99 
Expressive 12.2 9.9 3.3 90 
Request 4.3 4.6 4.4 41 





Scientific 4.6 5.7 48.8 88 
Prevalence 24.1 30.2 8.8 237 
Protection 51.9 43.3 47.7 419 
Emergent  2.5 3.3 5.5 30 
Action/Policy 31.4 42.6 44.4 355 
Fc
s 




. Interactive 19.4 21.1 18.8 184 
Corrective 1.8 1.6 0 14 








Group 11.9 12.8 40 138 
Other lang. 5.4 3.1 0 32 




r Expert/Staff 2.8 4.2 11.1 41 
Political 2.8 3.5 2.2 29 
External 12.2 9.5 10 94 






c Collective 10.8 13 8.8 108 
Emphasis 10.4 9.3 7.7 86 
Positive 3.2 2.9 2.2 27 





Image 80.5 76.8 83.3 709 
Video 7.9 8.4 17.7 83 
Text-in-image 42.9 39.6 24.4 353 
Hyperlink 55.2 73.4 91.1 628 
Hashtag 69.3 69.1 92.2 645 
Note: Percentages in bold reflect higher differences across agency levels. 
1. Mention calculations do not include direct replies.  
 
Figure 2 shows two illustrative examples of tweets 
from the sample. The tweet on the left includes an 
expressive, a  collective frame, prevalence information, 
hashtags, a  URL, and text-in-image. It also has an 
infographic, as it includes statistics and illustrations 
with how-to-protect instructions. It was retweeted 86 
times, or by .42% of the agency’s follower count. 
In contrast, the tweet on the right has a reference to 
a material resource (i.e. testing site), a  weak reference 
to prevalence (“rapid rise in…”), no statistics, no 
URL, a simple illustration (the map icon) but without 
any additional images or text-in-image. The 
diffusion/retransmission rate of this message was 
0.037%, quite below the more common mean 
diffusion rate (DR) as shown in Table 4.  
4.3 Message features and diffusion rates 
Table 4 presents results of t-tests of differences in 
mean DR between messages that contained the feature 
compared to those that did not. Results are read as 
follows: posts that contained a representative were on 
average retweeted by .059% of the follower count of 
the agency that made the post. This was a statistically  
significant difference compared to the .025% diffusion 
rate of messages without this feature.  
We found that posts containing a representative, 
prevalence, action/policy, text-in-image tended to be 
retweeted more frequently. Posts containing a  
directive, question, scientific, material resource, 
population group, other language, expert/staff, 
political, and video were less likely to be retweeted. 
    
Table 4. t-tests of differences in mean DR between 




mean DR  
w/  
feature 















Directive 0.061 0.047 -1.96 0.049 ** 
Question  0.056 0.038 -2.28 0.023 ** 
Expressive  0.053 0.065 1.03 0.304 n.s. 
Request 0.054 0.053 -0.14 0.884 n.s. 





Scientific 0.056 0.037 -2.89 0.004 *** 
Prevalence 0.042 0.090 5.41 0.000 *** 
Protection 0.058 0.050 -1.16 0.243 n.s. 
Emergent  0.052 0.120 1.02 0.314 n.s. 
Action/Policy 0.049 0.063 1.69 0.090 * 
Fc
s 




. Interactive 0.054 0.054 -0.10 0.913 n.s. 
Corrective 0.052 0.180 0.89 0.390 n.s. 








Group 0.059 0.025 -5.28 0.000 *** 
Other lang. 0.055 0.018 -6.65 0.000 *** 




r Expert/Staff 0.055 0.029 -3.64 0.000 *** 
Political 0.055 0.023 -4.16 0.000 *** 
External 0.055 0.045 -1.21 0.226 n.s. 






c Collective 0.052 0.067 1.11 0.266 n.s. 
Emphasis 0.054 0.055 0.06 0.948 n.s. 
Positive 0.054 0.058 0.20 0.836 n.s. 





Image 0.056 0.054 -0.19 0.847 n.s. 
Video 0.056 0.041 -1.75 0.081 * 
Text-in-image 0.047 0.065 2.28 0.022 ** 
Hyperlink 0.055 0.054 -0.05 0.952 n.s. 
Hashtag 0.056 0.054 -0.36 0.717 n.s. 
Sig. levels in bold: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
1. Replies are rarely retweeted. 2. Sample is too small to be tested.  
Figure 2. Example posts with varied text and media 
features (see details at lhei.org/covid19study.html) 
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The use of most media features were not associated 
with higher diffusion rates, except for text-in-image, 
Although not statistically significant, Table 4 shows 
that messages that referred to an emergent event, had 
a collective frame or corrective had a relatively higher 
diffusion rate than messages without those features.  
5. Discussion 
This study was motivated to improve frameworks 
used to study social media messages for crisis and risk 
communication. We developed a framework focused 
on textual and media features of a post, integrating 
categories from the literature, and adding relevant 
features not previously discussed in similar studies. 
We also provide empirical results on analyses of: (1) 
the inter-rater reliability of the message features from 
sampled Twitter posts; (2) Twitter activity of US 
public health agencies during multiple waves of the 
Covid-19 pandemic in 2020; (3) distribution of various 
message features across local, state and federal 
agencies; and (4) analytical tests for the association 
between message features and message diffusion.  
 
Toward a generalizable framework for social 
media message analysis. The inter-rater reliability  
results of our framework indicate the developed 
framework is promising. In our study most features 
that required human annotation were above .7 of 
Cohen's kappa, while a few related to rhetorical tactics 
and corrective were around the .6 mark. We suggest  
that the textual and media based nature of this 
framework helps with the generalizability of the model 
across crisis situations, and can help researchers and 
practitioners give focus to more objective and deeper 
elements of short text communication.  
Previous similar studies often do not report inter-
rater reliability [12, 13]; have remarkably high levels 
for rather abstract categories [16, 26]; or use a lexical 
(keyword) approach without any human annotation  
[10, 11]. A similar study found that Facebook 
messages with “warning”, “condolences”, or 
“encouragement” content had Krippendorff’s a lpha 
levels between 0.5 to 0.75 [4]. This all suggests that  
this type of message analysis is difficult, but that our 
framework is promising and could improve with better 
definitions of the constructs.  
 
Importance of differentiating communication 
strategies by government levels. Studies of crisis and 
risk communication messages on social media usually 
focus on a single level of government [4, 12, 26], and 
when local, state and federal agencies are captured 
they do not explore how different types of messages 
may be associated with different types of agencies or 
levels of government [10, 11]. Whereas examining 
local, state and federal agencies functions as a strong 
test for the reliability and validity of the framework 
across government agencies, it also enables us to see 
how agency levels may focus more or less on different 
types of messages or include different types of 
message content.  
For example, in our study we found that expressives, 
which mostly refer to expressions of sentiment, are 
employed almost 4 times more by local agencies than 
federal agencies. It may be fair to speculate this is due 
to a closer connection, real or imaged, between local 
agencies and their publics, compared to the connection 
between the public and the federal government.   
Scientific information, on the other hand, which 
refers to more technical information regarding the 
causes, risks or impacts of the threat was used about 4 
times more by federal agencies compared to state and 
local agencies. This observation may be due to this 
specific crisis situation, as a  novel coronavirus that 
surged in China at the end of 2019 and quickly became 
a global pandemic [36]. In this case, federal agencies 
such as the  National Institutes of Health (NIH) had 
been researching coronavirus and were paramount in 
developing the Covid-19 vaccine [40]. We may thus 
suggest that local and state agencies needed and relied 
on scientific information from federal agencies. 
A number of other interesting, and potentially 
expected patterns emerged, not all of which can be 
discussed here. Nevertheless, federal agencies focused 
more on segmenting messages based on population 
group, and had ubiquitous use of hyperlinks and 
hashtags. This may be partially explained by the fact 
that in federal agencies government communicators 
need to speak to larger and thus more diverse 
communities. Local and state agencies were 
nevertheless more focused on providing prevalence 
statistics, likely because of the specificities of regional 
variations of the pandemic progression, and the fact 
that Covid-19 dashboards and information systems 
were being largely developed by state agencies [41]. 
 
Understanding associations between message 
features and message diffusion. Our findings have 
practical implications for government emergency 
response and public health communication strategies 
by identifying features associated with message 
diffusion rates. When the purpose of the social media 
communication is to improve the diffusion of 
messages and increase message reach, government 
agencies can adopt (or avoid) features that are 
positively (negatively) associated with diffusion rate.  
Some notable findings include the significant 
differences between messages that contained a 
representative from those that did not,  which had been 
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previously observed [3]. Representatives are the 
statements that describe or explain information. It is 
thus relevant for communicators to recognize to make 
posts that at least have a single such statement.  
Messages from political accounts generally have 
higher rates of message sharing compared to those 
from government accounts [10, 11], however, in this 
study when a political figure or agency expert/staff 
was a subject in an agency message, on average it did 
not help with message diffusion. This may be because 
part of the public wants politics out of public health 
communication, or related to findings that mention of 
others does not help message diffusion [11, 14]. 
Government and public health communicators may 
thus want to be cautioned if making these references.  
Correcting misinformation during a pandemic is an 
important task [30], but previous studies have had 
mixed results on the impact of this variable on 
message diffusion [3]. Although results here are not 
statistically significant, they clearly point in the 
direction of a positive impact for correctives. This thus 
suggests that communicators can expect more than 
average public engagement when correcting rumors.  
In our framework we included distinct types of 
images that are rarely systematically explored. Images 
are important in risk communication for attention, 
recall and comprehension [17], and previous studies 
all point to the importance of images to increase 
message diffusion [4, 14, 27]. In general, our results 
show that the presence of an image did not increase 
diffusion. However, we were not able not analyze the 
more specific types of images for this report. Our study 
does point to the importance of text-in-image as also 
indicated in a recent study [11]. This suggests that 
“While style and context can matter, content is key to 
retransmission potential.” [11]. The images are 
important, but equally or more important is the 
semantic and textual information in the messages.   
6. Limitations and future studies  
To improve on this research, a number of avenues 
are clearly warranted. First, further formalization of 
our model is necessary. This study points to the 
importance in capturing message features that are 
grounded on the text itself, rather than on assumptions 
from readers or researchers. But given this objective 
focus IRR measures should improve. A more literal 
and text-based approach can also more easily be 
integrated into an ontology or a formalized semantic 
network [5, 20]. Automatic classification of message 
features are possible via machine learning [5].  
A second opportunity for future research is to 
further explore differences across local, state and 
federal agencies. There are different ways to balance 
the sample, and our strategy prioritized sampling from 
most prevalent accounts. Future study can improve 
with a deeper look into the different needs and 
tendencies of different agency levels.  
Other clear avenues for research include using a 
higher sample. Although previous studies had been 
successful with lower samples, given this set of 
features as used here will likely require a sample of 
posts at least twice as large (e.g. roughly 2000 posts). 
Also, developing a more controlled model to test the 
impact of message features on message diffusion can 
ultimately validate the findings. Lastly, future 
research, either from a communication, information 
systems, or health informatics perspective needs to 
include and compare messages across social media 
platforms, which is rarely done in the literature.   
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